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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
The ordinance in question applied to the "loop," a downtown business dis-
trict about nine blocks in length by eight blocks in width, between the hours
of 7 and 6 on any regular business day, Saturday afternoons and holidays
being excepted. The enactment did not apply to ambulances, emergency
vehicles of the United States, City of Chicago, or Cook County, or to public
utility vehicles while the operator thereof was engaged in emergency duties.
The argument in the opinion is devoid of support for the conclusion
reached. In holding the ordinance to be void the court concedes a number
of propositions which could well have formed the basis of the opposite ruling.
The court recognizes that a municipality has the power to regulate the use
of its streets and the traffic upon them, and points out that modern condi-
tions call for drastic restrictions. The court concedes quite properly and
reasonably, that the ordinance notwithstanding its literal terms, did not
prohibit the stops permitted or directed by other ordinances such as those
for loading and unloading merchandise, stops in traffic, and other necessary
stops.
Citation of authorities is rather unnecessary to demonstrate that this deci-
sion is undoubtedly out of line with the modern viewpoint, but a few recent
cases may be helpful. Ordinances prohibiting parking in certain restricted
localities between certain hours, or at all times, or limiting the parking
privilege to one hour, thirty minutes, or even a shorter period are common
and have been sustained. Pugh v. City of Des Moines (1916) 176 Iowa 593,
156 N. W. 892; Welsh v. Town of Morristown (N. J. 1923) 121 Atl. 697, af-
firmed in Welsh v. Potts (1924) 99 N. J. L. 528, 124 Atl. 926; Cavanaugh V.
Gerk (1926) 313 Mo. 375, 280 S. W. 51. Prohibition of taxicab stands in
certain areas and on certain streets has been uniformly upheld. City of
New Orleans v. Calamari (1922) 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172; Sanders V. Atlanta
(1918) 147 Ga. 819, 95 S. E. 695. In the same way other vehicles have been
prohibited from the use of portions of streets designated as taxicab stands.
Commonwealth v. Rice (1927) 261 Mass. 340, 158 N. E. 797. Certain types
of vehicles have been prohibited from using streets in certain areas at any
time. Smallwood v. District of Columbia (Dist. Col. 1927) 17 F. (2) 210.
To relieve congestion cities have been permitted to designate streets for one-
way traffic only. Commonwealth v. Nolan (1920) 189 Ky. 34, 224 S. W. 506.
It has been held within the police power of a city to regulate traffic on par-
ticular streets, even to complete exclusion of busses therefrom. Peoples'
Rapid Transit Co. v. Atlantic City (N. J. 1929) 144 AtI. 630. While the en-
actment in the principal case is perhaps wider in its scope than those in cer-
tain of the above cases, to declare it unreasonable and invalid seems as lack-
ing in legal justification as it is unmindful of practical metropolitan traffic
conditions. C. V. E., '31.
TORTS--APPLCATION OF FLETCHER V. RYLANDS PRINCIPLE TO PIPE LINE
COMPANis.-In the case of Behle v. Shell Pipe Line Co. (Mo. 1929) 17 S.
W. (2d) 1056, the question involved was the defendant's liability for damage
to plaintiff's land caused by the escape of oil through a leak or break in de-
fendant's pipe line. The case went to the jury on a presumption of negli-
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gence, and damages were awarded to the plaintiff. It is interesting to note,
however, the following statement of the court: "It is by no means certain
that a pipe line company which transports a deleterious foreign substance
such as crude oil in large quantities, through agricultural lands, and allows
it to pour out over and devastate the lands adjacent to its lands ought not
to be held liable regardless of negligence, under the rule announced in
Fletcher v. Rylands (1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330."
Fletcher v. Rylands, supra, is a classic case on the subject; and it laid
down the rule imposing absolute liability upon one who brings a foreign
substance on his land, which, if it escapes, may cause damage to another.
Exceptions to the rule are made where the damage is caused by an act of
God, vis major, or through the fault of the injured person. But Fletcher v.
Rylands has been repudiated in the United States in the case of Losec V.
Buchanan (1873) 51 N. Y. 476, and the court there predicates liability upon
negligence. The latter theory is the generally accepted one. Marshall V.
Wellwood (1876) 38 N. J. L. 341; Livingston v. Adams (N. Y. 1828) 8
Cowen 175; Brown v. Collins (1873) 53 N. H. 446.
Though the principal case expresses some doubt as to the Missouri atti-
tude on the question, it appears that Missouri courts favor strongly the
view stated in Losee v. Buchanan. The most frequently cited Missouri case
is Murphy v. Gillum (1897) 73 Mo. A. 487. In accord is Schindler v. Stand-
ard Oil Co. of Indiana (1921) 207 Mo. A. 190, 232 S. W. 735, which flatly
repudiates Fletcher v. Rylands and cites in support thereof Murphy v. Gil-
lum, above; Griffith v. Lewis (1885) 17 Mo. A. 605, and McCord Rubber Co.
v. St. Joseph Water Co. (1904) 181 Mo. 678, 81 S. W. 189. It was declared
in Chapman et al. v. American Creosoting Co. (Mo. 1926) 286 S. W. 837,
that "the doctrine of Fletcher v. Rylands has not been followed in this state.
It is necessary to prove negligence on the part of the one maintaining a dam
for the ponding of water on his premises." The Fletcher V. Rylands doc-
trine was also denied in Farrar v. Shuss et al. (1926) 221 Mo. A. 472, 282
S. W. 512, and Rosen v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. (Mo. 1928) 5 S. W.
(2d) 649.
However Missouri has applied the doctrine of absolute liability in cases
involving nuisance per se; as where the damage resulted from the storing of
nitroglycerine on the premises. French v. Manufacturing Co. (1913) 173
Mo. A. 220, 158 S. W. 723. Also, in the case of blasting, Hoffman '. Walsh
(1906) 117 Mo. A. 278, 93 S. W. 853; Faust v. Pope (1908) 132 Mo. A. 287,
111 S. W. 878. But, in the case of a blasting which is not a nuisance, negli-
gence must be proved. Thurmond v. White Line Ass'n. (1907) 125 Mo. A.
73, 102 S. W. 617.
Even in a jurisdiction which accepts the principle of Fletcher v. Rylands
there remains a still further problem, namely, are the circumstances of the
particular case such as will justify a proper application of that view. At
any event it is not imposed indiscriminately. McCord Rubber Co. v. St.
Joseph Water Co., above. For an elaborate note on the entire subject see
15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 541; also Pollock, TORTS (12th ed. 1923) 495.
H. J. A., '31.
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